Ships that Pass in the Night: Tacit Knowledge in Psychology and Sociology by Collins, Harry & Reber, Arthur
 
Philosophia Scientiæ














Date of publication: 1 October 2013




Harry Collins and Arthur Reber, « Ships that Pass in the Night: Tacit Knowledge in Psychology and
Sociology », Philosophia Scientiæ [Online], 17-3 | 2013, Online since 01 October 2016, connection on 07
November 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/893  ; DOI : https://
doi.org/10.4000/philosophiascientiae.893 
Tous droits réservés




School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Wales (UK)
Arthur Reber
Brooklyn College and the Graduate Centre
of the City University of New York (USA)
University of British Columbia, Vancouver (Canada)
Résumé : Reber et Collins sont l’un et l’autre des chercheurs reconnus, res-
pectivement en psychologie et en sociologie. Tous deux ont pour objet central
d’intérêt l’analyse et l’investigation de la connaissance tacite. Pourtant, aucun
d’eux n’a lu ou cité le travail de l’autre. Nous nous demandons ici comment
cette proximité d’intérêt peut coexister avec cette ignorance. Pendant plu-
sieurs mois, nous avons exploré les différences entre nos visions du monde, nos
approches du sujet et les difficultés de l’interdisciplinarité. L’article est un ré-
sumé de cet échange, présenté comme une sorte d’étude de cas sur la manière
de pratiquer la science. Nous concluons par une liste des propriétés générales
que possède le dialogue associé à ce genre d’« incommensurabilité » et faisons
état de notre aversion pour le tribalisme dans la vie académique.
Abstract: Reber and Collins are each major researchers in psychology and
sociology respectively. Both focus on the analysis and investigation of tacit
knowledge. Yet neither had read or cited the other’s work. Here we explore
how this similarity of interest can coexist in the midst of ignorance. Over many
months we explored the differences in our world views, our approaches to the
topic and the difficulties of interdisciplinarity. This paper is a summary of
that exchange presented as a kind of case-study in doing science. We conclude
with a list of the general properties of the dialogue associated with this kind
of “incommensurability” and state our distaste for tribalism in academic life.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 17 (3), 2013, 135–154.
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Introduction
This piece is different from others in the volume. Arthur Reber (AR) and
Harry Collins (HC) have each been working on tacit knowledge for most of their
careers taking leading roles in establishing the topic in psychology, sociology
and philosophy. Reber published his first paper on the topic in 1967 [Reber
1967] and Collins in 1974 [Collins 1974]. But neither of them has ever cited
the other or, until very recently, read the other’s work despite the fact that
the words “tacit” and “knowledge” are prominent in the titles of papers and
even books that each has written [Collins 2010], [Reber 1993]. When Reber
was asked to referee a contribution to this volume, the two of them fell into
an email exchange. They discovered that poor scholarship was only part of
what was keeping them apart. As the exchange stretched across five months
and some 300 contributions, they found the real problem is that they speak
different academic languages. In fact they speak different languages even in
respect of the central topic of this volume and of much of their academic
lives—tacit knowledge. They began to feel that they had stumbled into what
seems to be a living instance of paradigm incommensurability [Kuhn 1962], or
something close to it. Thus, the following exchange (25 November, 2012):
AR: I think that part of the difficulty I’ve been having reading
your writings (especially Tacit and Explicit Knowledge) is that you
seem to struggle to say things that hit me with a “well, duh, of
course...”. In one email you went on about saluting and in various
papers you talk about parsing various kinds of tacit knowledge
and different instantiations of the act of riding a bicycle and I
keep trying to figure out what you’re trying to convince me of
that I don’t already know.
HC: The origins [of the problem] could be that you don’t quite
get that I am dealing with knowledge-stuff rather than individual
learning.
But later (31 December, 2012) we still find:
AR: Figuring out how humans do things is what I do. And it is
still a strain on my brain to comprehend that it is not what you
do.
HC: Whereas, as I keep saying, I am interested in knowledge-stuff,
not how humans learn.
AR: I know this when you say this. I understand the words. Then
I say to Rhiannon [AR’s professional psychologist wife], “do you
know what Harry wrote today?” [...] and I find that I cannot form
the words to express this thought of yours because it doesn’t fit in
my framework. In my world there is no such thing as “knowledge
stuff” independent of the humans holding the knowledge. It feels
like saying you’re interested in how pawns move without looking
at the game of chess.
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These differences and the way they play themselves out in each discipline
seemed worth exploring—so the conversation continued.
The authors have never met. Perhaps things would have been easier if we
had. There were occasions when the dialogue came close to ending because
of frustrations and personal misunderstandings that arose with brittle and
inflammatory email interchanges. With face-to-face discussion it is possible
to transmit more of the tacit! But we believe there is enough here to shed
some light on the problems of interdisciplinarity. The purpose of this paper
is, then, to explore and, to some extent, explain how such a situation can
arise and continue. The focus will, of course, be centred on the example of
the analysis of tacit knowledge but inter alia, the analysis may shed some
light on academic misunderstandings in general—perhaps helping others who
find themselves in a similar position—and it may even shed a little on the
relationship between psychology and sociology. Toward the end of the paper
there is a section describing the “Seven causes of misunderstanding” (p. 150)
that we were able to pull out of our experience. This list may prove useful to
those who find themselves faced with similar problems.
1 Different starting points
Some of the divergence can be explained by the parties’ paradigmatic early
experiments and observations in the field of tacit knowledge. Reber asked
individuals to memorize sequences of letters that were, though they did not
know it, made up using complex rules—an “artificial grammar” [Reber 1967].
Over time they became sensitive to these patterns and could differentiate novel
well-formed sequences from those that violated the rules even though they were
unaware of what they had learned or even that they had learned—it was tacit
knowledge. He called the process implicit learning and he contrasted it with
other approaches that treated learning as a self-conscious process of hypothesis
and test.
Collins noted that scientists trying to learn from others how to build a new
kind of laser—the TEA-laser—failed unless time was spent in a successful laser-
builder’s company [Collins 1974]. Even the most detailed written specifications
would not enable them to build successfully though they could follow the
circuit diagram and use components from the same manufacturers. No one
knew what was being transferred in these face-to-face interactions—it was
tacit knowledge.
Reber’s approach was quintessentially psychological—the artificial lab-
based phenomenon being stripped down to its basic essentials in an effort to
control all the variables. Collins’s was quintessentially sociological—a messy,
natural, social situation. Collins’s initial focus was less on the reasons for fail-
ure of transmission and more on overall outcomes and the fact that face-to-face
interaction was vital—though he went into more detail in later studies. One
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can, perhaps, see why for Reber the very meaning of knowledge became associ-
ated with the actions of individuals and was generally explored independent of
society whereas for Collins its very meaning was to be found in what unfolded
in society.1 Thus, for Reber, tacit came to be a synonym for unconscious,
implicit. For Collins it was semantically closer to unspoken or unexplicated.2
Making matters worse was that each used explicit as an antonym, though for
Reber this meant that the knowledge was made conscious by self-reflection
while for Collins it meant that it could be explicated or explained.
While nowadays there is little reference in the psychological literature to
the acquisition of tacit knowledge—the term introduced by Reber, implicit
learning, having become the default term—the attention of psychologists tends
to be on the acquisition of tacit knowledge rather than the substance. In
sociology, particularly Collins’s approach, the effort is to analyze the substance.
So we have Reber exploring process while Collins is concerned with content.
2 Ontologies
The authors are informed by different ontologies. Consciousness is important
to Reber and unimportant to Collins. Collins puts a strong emphasis on the
social nature of knowledge which is largely ignored by Reber. Reber empha-
sizes continuity between humans and other species whereas Collins emphasizes
difference. Reber believes that consciousness is a primitive property of living
organisms. He associates knowledge with consciousness and this means that
machines (at least current machines which are not made of living materials)
do not have knowledge. Reber is strongly informed by evolutionary theory
and sees steady development from one entity into another with consciousness
always present but its power evolving.
AR: I’m interested in “human acquisition” of knowledge but it is
an interest that is a subset of much else. Human knowledge lies on
a continuum with that of other species. I argue that the implicit
mode of acquisition is fundamentally the same as various learning
processes seen across the phylogenetic scale.
The two authors discovered that their uses of the terms consciousness and
reflectiveness were somewhat confounded. For example, both agreed that cats
were conscious but this did no explanatory work for Collins whereas it was
important to Reber. Reber also considered that cats might well be reflective
from time to time. In his view, a cat always “has consciousness” like a person
1. The difference between the controlled experimental set up and the untidy and
relatively uncontrolled social observation often gives rise to friction between psychol-
ogists and sociologists. In this case, however, both contributors were open-minded
enough to admire the work of the other and the experimental/natural divide did not
play a significant part in the debate.
2. AR: As derived from taciturn.
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or a snake or any other living entity—though the form of consciousness differs
dramatically from species to species. A cat that is awake is “being conscious”;
one that is asleep is “unconscious”. A cat that is acting in automatic, pure
bottom-up mode—what it does virtually all the time except perhaps some
occasional flickering of reflection—is acting implicitly, without conscious mod-
ulation of its behaviour. Thus for Reber, self-conscious attention to activity
was the same as being reflective. In implicit learning there was no reflection
going on whereas self-conscious rule-based learning was reflective.
Collins thinks that, in the main, only humans are reflective. Reflectiveness
is tied up with the use of language. He agrees that there is a fuzzy border-
line between humans and animals occupied by creatures such as chimps and
dolphins which may share the rudiments of a language but Collins thinks that
creatures on the borderline should be ignored if the argument about the nature
of reflection is to be clear. Reber thinks the borderline is critical because he’s
far from convinced that it is language per se that is key to reflection. Human
language, in his view, emerged along with high-level cognitive functions. It is
likely that these cognitive abilities were instrumental in language and in the
capacity for self-reflection rather than one causing the other. The jury is out
on this but Reber is not comfortable assigning such a vital role to language.
He notes that communication is a fundamental feature of many species—this
fits with his preference for continuity.
Collins, who is interested in differences, insists on using cats as the animal
example so as to get away from the borderline—no one thinks cats are language
users. But, as noted, Reber even allows cats to be part of his continuum: they
don’t reflect much on their knowledge but they might do so every now and
again and they certainly communicate. Collins is drawn in exactly the opposite
direction and, to make the point, he now proposes the ‘tacit-to-explicit’ test.
A species can only be said to be capable of reflection, according to Collins’s
newly invented criterion, if we can imagine some of its members trying to
make their tacit knowledge explicit so that they can store it (as they see it), in
cave-paintings, in hieroglyphs, and in books, and so that they can broadcast
it to others not in the vicinity, and so on.3 As can be seen, Collins’s thought
style (see “Seven causes of misunderstanding” p. 150) leads him to draw things
apart; Reber’s thought style leads him to draw things together. But in both
worlds, it is only humans who endeavour to make their knowledge explicit.
Collins’s central concept is socialness which is based on human language.
Language is not the same as information exchange, so bees and ants are ex-
cluded (one can see also that they would fail the tacit-to-explicit test). He
3. In TEK this criterion is what marks out “knowers” from non-knowers (knowers
are not the same as entities that have knowledge—they must also be able to reflect
on it). Initially, in this paper, Collins proposed the “vegetarian test”—to qualify to be
a reflective species, sub-groups within it must be capable of self-consciously choosing
to change their diet. The tacit-to-explicit test serves the same purpose but fits better
with the topic of tacit knowledge and the notion of “knower” discussed in TEK.
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believes there is a clear division between entities that are social in this sense
and those that are not. Compare Reber:
AR: Ever watch a cat? It moves, turns left, stops, licks its front
leg, goes over to a toy, picks it up, tosses it, chases it [...] and
so on and so on. [...] Now go back and think how you spent the
morning... you got up, scratched, rubbed your tummy, brushed
your teeth, made coffee/tea (whatever), walked down the hallway
[all unreflectively]. [...] It seems to me that you and the cat (and
me) are rather similar...
For Reber, of course, humans do additional things that involve reflection like
decide to send an email, argue a philosophical point and go shopping. In the
view of both Reber and Collins, however, virtually every interesting thing that
humans do involves a blend of the implicit and the explicit, the unconsciousness
and the conscious, the automatic and the reflective. Though, as explained, for
Reber, but not for Collins, even the cat might reflect occasionally. For both,
the self-conscious reflective things that humans do are different from the things
that the cat does most of the time. So Reber sees two kinds of things happening
in this scenario: the cat and the human doing similar unreflective things and
the human doing reflective things (but in another scenario the cat could be
doing reflective things too).
Collins, however, sees the cat and the human as very different even when
they are both doing things unreflectively. In particular, the cat cannot brush
its teeth, make coffee/tea or even, in his view, walk down the ‘hallway’—a
hallway connotes a great deal to a human while a cat is just walking along an
elongated space. Humans can only do things like brush teeth, make caffeinated
beverages and walk in halls, however unreflectively they do them, because of
the existence of a range of corresponding institutions linked together by lan-
guage. Nothing the cat does is like this. Cats’ activities are circumscribed
by their evolutionary history; different groups of humans are, however, enor-
mously different, the differences emerging from the reflective activities of other
humans who are distant in time and space from what is going on now. From
Collins’s perspective, all these humans are linked together by a network of
common social activity and language. So while both cat and human may be
doing things in an unreflective way, most things that humans do depend on
a history of reflection by other humans of a kind that the cat has not shared
and cannot share since it has no language nor social life in the strong sense of
social. Reber has no deep problems with this form of analysis which he views
as a viable, if different, way to approach learning, language, communication
and social function.
2.1 The tacit
AR: [...] when you use the term “tacit” [...] to distinguish it from
“that which can be explicated”, you are flying in the face of a half-
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century of usage in psychology. [...] When I introduced the term
“implicit” (in my MA thesis), I specifically chose it as a contrast
against the “explicit” hypothesis-testing process that was being
championed by people like Jerry Bruner at Harvard. Bruner and
colleagues were developing a theory of knowledge acquisition that
was based on the assumption that people learned new stuff by
testing explicit (i.e., consciously held) hypothesis about how the
world about them functioned [Bruner, Goodnow & Austin 1956].
If their guesses were confirmed, knowledge became fixed. If dis-
confirmed, they tried another one. It was an extension of the
“hypothetico-deductive” approach to science. Bruner was trying
to push it into personal epistemology—a position which you would
almost certainly call “idiotic”. I did but for different reasons. My
view was that this approach wasn’t wrong in any fundamental
way. It was merely grotesquely limited. Yes, in rare circumstances
people behave this way but they are few and far between. For ex-
ample, it made no sense when talking about how an infant learned
language or a child became inculcated with the mores of the sur-
rounding social world. And, as you would agree, it made no sense
at all when looking at how science was actually done—despite
the fact that this is where Bruner began. None of these things
were learned consciously, not language, not socialization, not even
most scientific knowledge—they were learned unconsciously. [...]
In cognitive psychology, making knowledge “explicit” is an act of
an individual who is discovering the nature and form of knowledge
previously held implicitly.
Both parties agree that (some) knowledge can be tacit for one person and
explicit for another (in Reber’s sense of tacit/implicit), and can be tacit for
one person at one time and explicit for the same person at another time.
Both agree that it is not uncommon for a single person, who has had some
piece of knowledge rendered explicit for him or her, to switch between using
that knowledge in an explicit/self-conscious way or an implicit/tacit/unself-
conscious way.
Consider the example of gear-changing in a car. Usually a novice driver
will initially be taught to change gears in an explicit way—something like “shift
into 2nd when the revs reach 2000”, or “change when the sound of the engine
reaches a high pitch”. After a while the rules are forgotten and gear-changing
becomes automatic, implicit. On the familiar commute to work we can be
thinking about all manner of things while changing gears without being aware
that we are doing it. Experienced drivers change gears unconsciously while
thinking about something else—but there is nothing to stop them executing the
shifts in a more self-conscious manner. For Reber the task changes when focus
of attention changes and the Reberian analysis concentrates on the different
nature of the task under conscious control versus non-conscious control. For
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example, non-conscious execution is generally more efficient for normal road
conditions whereas self-conscious attention might be better when the road is
icy. Collins acknowledges all this but it is not a central feature of his analysis
of knowledge.
For Collins, gear-changing is the same ‘mimeomorphic’ (and therefore ex-
plicable) action whether it is currently being executed by a human in a self-
conscious way, by a human in an implicit manner, or by an automatic gearbox
mimicking the action. What makes it the same kind of action irrespective
of how it is carried out at any specific time is that the action can be repro-
duced without reference to social context. Collins and Kusch called this a
mimeomorphic action because it can be reproduced (or mimicked) by merely
reproducing the behaviour associated with the action (e.g., as with a salute)
[Collins & Kusch 1998]. In contrast, a polimorphic action depends on sensi-
tivity to social context because the same behaviour does not always reproduce
the same action (e.g., a greeting which, to be authentic, has to be varied from
time to time). The terms mimeomorphic and polimorphic refer to whether
or not the externally visible ‘shape’ of the action is merely copied or must
change from social instance to social instance. To Collins, the very fact that
there can be such a thing as an automatic gearbox is a consequence of gear-
changing being a mimeomorphic action rather than polimorphic. It means
that, in so far as gear-changing can be imagined to be learned entirely tacitly
(and one can imagine such a scenario), it would be a species of Relational or
Somatic Tacit Knowledge, not Collective Tacit Knowledge. Reber appreciates
this parsing of the domain of tacit knowledge but it does not play a significant
role in his thinking.
2.2 The key distinction
The examples of gear-changing and the cat reflect Collins’s interest in
“knowledge-stuff” and Reber’s in individual learning and execution of acts.
Collins and Reber cut up the world in different ways. For Reber, the es-
sential thing is that actions like gear-changing can be done self-consciously
or unselfconsciously depending on circumstances; the topic is the different
ways of executing gear-changing. For Collins all gear-changing, however it
is actually done, is of the same kind; it is knowledge that can be explicated
and (potentially) automated with foreseeable technology as opposed to knowl-
edge that cannot be explicated and automated with foreseeable technology.4
For Reber, the cat and the human, when they are being unreflective, are ex-
hibiting the same kind of knowledge—or at least using similar evolutionarily
ancient systems for expressing the knowledge. For Collins, in most instances
the knowledge is very different. In Reber’s work, gear-changing can take two
forms, conscious and unconscious; in Collins’s work there is but one form—
4. Another influence on Collins’s approach to the debate is his later critique of
artificial intelligence [Collins 2010], [Collins & Kusch 1998].
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mimeomorphic. For Reber, unreflective cat and unreflective human exhibit
one kind of knowledge; for Collins they exhibit two.
Finally, notice that the data from Reber’s experiments have been simulated
by neural net models, suggesting that associationistic models can capture as-
pects of the tacit dimension of human knowledge. However, in Reber’s view a
neural net is just a model of a system that likely exists in brains. Nets don’t
have knowledge just like chess playing computers don’t know anything about
chess. For Collins, in spite of Reber’s qualifications, the success of computers
like neural nets in reproducing the effects shows the restricted range of the
tasks that are modelled in the Reber experiments—they concentrate on the
mimeomorphic aspects of language.
3 Knowledge and consciousness
Eventually they began to realize that they were using consciousness in differ-
ent ways; in some of these the connotations overlapped with knowledge and
broader issues of epistemology but, alas, in others they didn’t.
AR: As we move along from simple and primitive organisms to the
complex and sophisticated there is a shift from being dominated
by the implicit to subsuming the implicit under an increasingly
important explicit system. This shift occurs for learning, for mem-
ory and for encoding emotional situations. They shift from being
utterly implicit to being open to introspective scanning and avail-
able for conscious recollection. There is a continuity here and, as
we move along the phylogenetic scale, various specialized forms
of “knowing” and “acting” and “retrieving” emerge. They do so to
fit the demands of particular ecological circumstances. As brains
got bigger the role of top-down, modulating functions increased.
In humans it reached its pinnacle.
In the Reber thought-style, knowledge is on a continuum understood to emerge
out of evolutionary forces. Therefore, it is Reber’s view that machines can-
not know things. They cannot have knowledge because, being made of non-
biological materials and, not belonging on the same evolutionary tree as hu-
mans, there is no consciousness there and the very notion of knowledge is
simply not applicable.
Collins went back to Reber three or more times to ask the question about
how he justified the claim that machines could not have knowledge but cats
could, even though both operated unconsciously at least some of the time. He
was never convinced by Reber’s answers even though he believed he understood
what Reber was saying. Here are examples of the interchange:
AR: “Consciousness” is a feature of particular kinds of organ-
isms. It denotes a continuum of subjectivity. Its most com-
plex (and intellectually seductive) instantiation occurs in humans.
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“Knowledge” is a body of facts and information that organisms
have. Since these organisms have consciousness, their knowledge
is linked with this phenomenal state—with the understanding that
much of this knowledge is acquired and held tacitly.
You can study knowledge in a disembodied way, of course, just
like you can study how a taste-bud responds to sugar but this
won’t get at what you experience when you eat chocolate cake.
So I guess the issue here isn’t so much whether these things are
ontologically distinguishable but what the goal of the exploration
is. I don’t think you’ll learn much about “knowledge” if you dis-
sociate it from the organism doing the “knowing”.
HC: In your world machines cannot have knowledge because they
do not have consciousness?
AR: When we say a computer “knows” how to do arithmetic, the
“knowing” here is, in my world, very different from when we say a
person “knows” how to. If you wish to say that the computer has
“machine knowledge” I guess that would be okay but it detracts
from the epistemic character we typically assign to “knowledge”.
HC: But a cat can have knowledge because it is conscious?
AR: I think of it in a Tom Nagel’ish fashion: There is something
it is like to be a cat. There is nothing it is like to be a computer.
HC: Even though a cat usually uses its knowledge unconsciously.
AR: Yes, but so do humans. Much (most?) of the time we’re on
automatic pilot [...] I spent this morning just like a cat.
We have already seen that Collins disagrees with this last claim but he also
just does not understand the role of consciousness. He does not understand
the confidence with which subjective understanding is readily imputed to cats
and readily denied to machines. This confidence seems to rest solely on the
theory that only living material is conscious. So Reber’s world view is consis-
tent but it seems to Collins that the position is not and cannot be established
by reference to evidence. Reber, of course, disagrees, feeling that there is
substantial empirical support for his position. It is a characteristic of incom-
mensurability that, where one person sees evidence, another person does not.
Here, from Collins’s viewpoint there is no evidence for Reber’s position, while
from Reber’s viewpoint there is more evidence for his position than there is for
Collins’s. Each party believes that the other is basing its argument on some-
thing less than adequate. Collins thinks Reber does not care about evidence,
whereas Reber thinks what Collins counts as evidence is no more substantial
than what he bases his own argument on. The interchange, then, can be said
to be characterised by “mismatched explanatory adequacy” (see “Seven causes
of misunderstanding” p. 150) even though each party believes the other is
making a mistake in the way it views the opponent’s position.
This tension reiterates the central discontinuities at the heart of both ap-
proaches. For Reber, he really was acting like a cat when he got up because
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what constitutes Reber’s universe is how creatures attend to what they are
doing and he and the cat attend (or not) in the same way much of the time;
furthermore, they are both conscious. For Collins, the knowledge of the cat
and the knowledge of the human are of completely different types and while
the human can act like an animal (e.g., scratching) the cat can never act
like even an unreflective human engaged in acts that depend on language.
Furthermore, Collins does not understand the explanatory status of claims
like a cat has knowledge because “there is something it is like to be a cat”
whereas a computer does not because there is nothing it is like to be a com-
puter.5 Reber notes that cats and people howl and jump if you stick them
with a pin. A computer makes no such response; it merely loses a couple of
bytes. In the former we have subjectivity and phenomenal experience, in the
latter we have neither. Collins understands what Reber is saying but does not
see it as evidence for consciousness being a correlate of knowledge.
Reber feels no need to define knowledge beyond what can be found in
the dictionary but Collins has to define knowledge-stuff. He inclines toward
what he thinks of as a Wittgensteinian meaning for knowledge, namely, that
to understand the meaning of words one must understand their use. To know
the meaning of a word, then, is to be able to use it as it is used in society.
This approach fits, as it happens, with the philosophy of the Turing Test where
intelligence is demonstrated by a performance that is indistinguishable from
that of an entity that is known to be intelligent—in the Turing Test it is use
that is the criterion.
Collins, then, thinks of knowledge as the stuff you have when you can do
certain things. If TEA-laser builders hung around with successful laser builders
something passed to them that was still in them on their journey home—and
which they could then use to build a successful laser when they arrived. There
was no reason to think that their knowledge was affected by what it felt like
to be a laser-builder and the readily available criterion of having knowledge
was being able to build a working laser. For Collins, it follows that we can
imagine a machine building a laser and this makes machines candidates for
the possession of knowledge and it means that work is required to show if and
why they would be different from human laser-builders. There is nothing in
the definition of machines or substance of machines that prevents them being
such candidates. Reber, from his evolutionary stance, demurs. The “Nagelish”
point isn’t that the notion that “there is something it is like to be laser-builder”
necessarily affects knowledge. It is a mental state whose causal roles need to
be determined. Collins thinks he understands what Reber is saying about
consciousness but does not see what it has to do with knowledge.
Collins argues, however, that existing and foreseeable machines cannot
have full human-like knowledge because they do not share human social life.
This argument is testable. It is, for example, why all current and foreseeable
5. Collins found Nagel’s article on being a bat disappointing [Nagel 1974]. Reber
liked it.
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machines fail properly conducted Turing Tests. The failure is visible from the
outside without reference to internal states.
Naturally, we had a long interchange about the Chinese Room which may
illustrate “focus blindness” (see “Seven causes of misunderstanding” p. 150)
or at least the difference between our projects. Searle’s Chinese Room, it
will be recalled, shows that a performance equivalent to that of a conscious
human does not prove consciousness [Searle 1980]. But this makes no difference
to Collins as he is only interested in performance, not consciousness. If the
Chinese Room worked in a linguistically perfect way as advertised, however,
it would disprove Collins’s view that no foreseeable computer can act as a
socially embedded being. But Collins believes the Chinese Room would not
and could not work as Searle describes it:
HC: [...] because language is the property of the embedding so-
ciety, is continually changing, and there is no mechanism linking
the Chinese Room to the changing society. Over time it would
start to perform archaically (just like a human isolated from so-
ciety). If a mechanism is put in place to link it to society (e.g.,
the database is updated by humans) then the ‘socialness’ will be
located in that mechanism, not the Chinese Room.
AR: I have difficulty with this argument. It seems to me pretty
straightforward that the Room is not conscious and, as with any
artificial entity, there is nothing it is like to be the Chinese Room.
In so far as it needs to be social, the social aspects of language
are embedded from the outset. Whatever information the Room
has at the beginning of the test was put there by programmers
with social knowledge. So why are they excluded from adding in-
formation over time? The humans it’s being compared with have
input. And if, as you say, this added socialness is then not “in”
the mechanism, why is it not “in” it at the very beginning?
HC: Yes, the social is in there when the Room is first set up but it
is a frozen snapshot. If the social is updated by human attendants
it is the attendants that are making the connection between the
Room and society—that is where the social gets in—the link via
the human attendants. That is the point! What we do not know
how to do is to automate that process. That, in my view, is the
key to making computers handle language like humans handle it.
We leave this exchange uncommented on as a classic instance of academic
misunderstanding.
4 Conclusion on consciousness
There seemed to be only one place where we wanted to say to each other “you
are wrong in a really serious way and I am right”. Reber thinks Collins will
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never understand knowledge if he does not take consciousness into account
as a central feature. Of course, Collins thinks no one understands knowledge
if they do not understand socialness but, more importantly, he thinks that
Reber’s division of the world into conscious and non-conscious, and therefore
knowledge-possessing and non-knowledge-possessing things is arbitrary and
explanatorily inadequate. Plants are out, but every other thing made of living
matter is in; everything not made of living matter is out. It seems to Collins
that, here, constructing a consistent world view has taken priority over the
desire to develop a theory with observable consequences.
Reber maintains that consciousness does have observable consequences.
One can see the difference when humans move from implicit to self-conscious
execution of a task. In fact, a variable often manipulated in experiments
on implicit learning is awareness. It turns out to be a critical component in
recruiting different kinds of cognitive processes and impacts on how individuals
engage in remembering material, making decisions, forming preferences and
making aesthetic judgements [Reber 1993], [Zizak & Reber 2004].
Collins finds that this reply does not bear on his question and sees this
difference as being no more significant than using two different computer pro-
grams to execute the same task. The question for Collins is: Are there things
that humans can do in virtue of their consciousness that machines cannot do
in virtue of their lack of consciousness? Collins cannot think of anything that
lack of consciousness in this sense, rules out (whereas he can list many things
that machines cannot do in virtue of their lack of socialness). Reber thinks
that Collins’s question is not a good one, or at least not useful, and he fails
to grasp how Collins deals with things like aesthetic judgements which require
consciousness and cannot be made by machines. Collins responds that if ma-
chines had socialness they would be able to make aesthetic judgements—which
are quintessentially social.
What divides the two parties here might be explained with a philosophical
analogy using the old philosophical puzzle, “If a tree falls in the forest and
there is no one around, does it make a sound?” One possible answer is “yes”
and “no” for it depends on your initial stance. To a physicist the tree creates
waves in the air called “sound waves” whether or not anyone hears them. To
a psychologist, for there to be sound, there must be someone who has the
subjective experience which we call “sound”.
In the same way one might ask: “If there were two machines having a
human-like conversation in a room and there is no one about to join in, is there
knowledge being exchanged?” Collins, from his “knowledge-stuff” perspective,
answers “yes” because, presumably, the machines are learning to do new things
from each other. Reber, from his subjectivist point of view, says “no”. Reber
acknowledges that there is this stuff called “knowledge” in the room but claims
it has nothing to do with humans knowing things any more than the physi-
cist’s description of the sound of a tree falling tells us anything about what
it sounds like.
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5 Evolution
Reber argues that evolutionary theory is the key to understanding human
knowledge. In Collins’s view, evolutionary theory is of very little help; the
most remarkable characteristic of humans is how different from each other
groups of humans have become since significant evolution ceased. This point
of departure is, perhaps, typical of tensions between psychologists and sociol-
ogists. Interestingly, however, Collins’s position is not so far from Reber’s in
one of its aspects as this extract from the interchange illustrates:
HC: In TEK I say that tacit knowledge is unexceptionable because
that is what animals and other living things have done since they
emerged from the slime and it is explicit knowledge that is ex-
traordinary.
AR: I could have written this last sentence myself...
So far so good, but then things started to diverge. Reber believes that human
knowledge evolved and that consciousness came with it. As Reber points out,
this has some interesting consequences for our expectations of the relative role
of implicit and conscious handling of knowledge: the early implicit elements of
our abilities (shared with animals, of course) should be relatively robust and
free from cultural variation.
This cuts right across what interests Collins. Almost the whole of Collins’s
academic life has been devoted to showing that what seems quintessentially
to be the product of conscious processes (much of what happens in science)
is deeply tacit (as in the example of the TEA-laser). Furthermore, language,
which comes very late on the evolutionary scene and is very much associated
with consciousness, is, for Collins, largely tacit in use. Collins, then, finds
Reber’s use of evolutionary theory and consciousness orthogonal to what he
wants to say about the relationship between language and the tacit.
There is, however, something more positive to be said. In TEK Collins
continually states that he does not understand the explicit; he does not under-
stand how strings carry meaning. For example, he points out that the icon for
house is nothing like a house so it is very hard to say what it is that is upside
down about the upside down version. In the face of these difficulties Collins
adopts the term affordance which he calls a “conceptual bandage” since he has
no concepts that would allow him to explain why an icon or anything else has
any affordance in the first place. TEK works by addressing an easier problem
which is how some string that has insufficient affordance to take part in an act
of communication can be enhanced (for example, by making it longer or more
elaborate).
But there is a big gap in Collins’s theory. How can any string have any
affordance in the first place? Were Collins ever to want to fill this gap he
suspects he might well be forced to adopt something like Reber’s evolutionary
approach. He would have to say that animals, as they emerged from the
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slime, evolved to extract certain basic shapes from the environment (such as
the upright triangle representing the roof in the house icon). That would be
a way, and the only way he can think of, to explain why we can see that
the upside-down icon is upside down. Collins, trying for a moment to adopt
Reber’s perspective, would predict that upright triangles, since they must have
become recognisable as distinctive entities so early on in human evolution,
should be recognised across all cultures. There must be, he would argue, a
substrate of fundamental shapes, patterns and perhaps colours and textures
that all humans recognise and upon which the variations in culture are built.6
Such influence as this underlying structure has is clearly “bottom-up”.
The trouble, for Collins, is that much of cultural variation is “top-down”.
Humans are capable of seeing almost anything as anything else. The ques-
tion is going to be how the top-down variation of actual and potential human
culture is related to the bottom-up structural vocabulary and how bottom-up
explanations can bear on top-down explanations. All that has been accom-
plished, then, is to see the point of evolutionary theory and acknowledge the
gaps in Collins’s theory in a more self-conscious way. But this has to be better
than mutual incomprehension and talking at cross-purposes.
6 Overall conclusion
The question we started with is how, for nearly half a century, two academics
could work on the analysis and exploration of tacit knowledge in their own dis-
ciplines and find no deep need to refer to each other’s work. The dialogue and
its analysis have shown, we believe, how it can be—they start with different
methods, fit into different world views, have different explanatory goals and use
different language to talk about them. In the main, these are just differences
and, in another universe, either party would be happy to have accomplished
what the other has done.
Nevertheless, one can see why the ships pass in the night. In TEK, Collins
claims to have constructed a map in which the many approaches to tacit
knowledge listed can be related. Staggeringly, Collins finds that he did not
even include Reber’s work in his inventory of approaches to tacit knowledge
and now he finds that it will not fit on the map, certainly not easily. The
map was based on the ways that the different approaches dealt with Collins’s
three kinds of tacit knowledge but the conscious/implicit individual works
with a different substance. Reber works with the forms of human attendance
6. In one exchange, Reber noted that there is research in perceptual and cognitive
psychology that coordinates with Collins’s speculations. Irv Biederman developed
a sophisticated model of perception based on 2D and 3D primitive forms like cir-
cles, cones and ellipses called “geons” that form the components of complex objects
[Biederman 1987]. Real and stylized houses, such as in Collins’s figures, are easily ab-
stracted as composed of just such forms. Biederman’s theory uses a surprisingly small
number of geons (less than 40) to account for virtually all relatively fixed objects.
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to tasks—that is the stuff of his world; Collins deals with the nature of the
tasks irrespective of how they are attended to from moment to moment and
that is what the map portrays.
There are other differences in the two approaches to the world that are
not so marked as the consciousness business but where Collins and Reber
had difficulty talking to each other. One is how language is acquired: Reber
has argued that the mechanism of implicit learning allows infants to pick up
the patterns of spoken signals and notes that there is a considerable litera-
ture supporting this notion [Reber 1993, 2011]. Collins believes we simply
do not know how humans pick up the cues from social life that are required
for fluency and, a fortiori, we have no idea how to build such a capacity
into a computer. Reber thinks that the implied link between knowing a good
deal about language learning and building such knowledge into a computer
isn’t warranted.
Another difference turned on the rather unusual perspective on scientific
truth of the sociology of scientific knowledge as it manifested itself in a dis-
cussion of parapsychology—which began as a sideline issue but quickly be-
came the focus of an unusual kind of mismatch. Reber has a robust view
of parapsychology—it is nonsense. Collins refuses to accept that as a useful
professional attitude and spent a long time trying to convince Reber that the
sociologist of scientific knowledge cannot begin by believing that one kind of
scientific view is nonsense if he or she is to investigate the social forces that
lead to it being widely seen as nonsense. Reber agrees that studying how sci-
entific nonsense becomes recognized as nonsense is a useful endeavor but it is
still nonsense. Collins thinks that the sociology of knowledge way of thinking
takes years of practice before it becomes natural and thinks that the difficulty
of this aspect of the exchange arose out of the impossibility of conveying the
approach through a few emails. Some of the main disagreement may have
been flavoured by Collins’s history in sociology of scientific knowledge—an
esoteric position.
Seven causes of misunderstanding
Toward the end of the exchange we were able to identify seven systematic
causes of misunderstanding.
Mismatched thought styles: Reber generally sees continuities whereas
Collins is drawn to bringing out sharp differences and classifications.
Reber focuses on individuals, Collins on collectivities.
Semantic mismatch: The parties often use the same word but with different
meanings without realizing it. It applies even to words at the very centre
of the discussion—as we mentioned earlier, for Reber tacit is a synonym
of “unconscious”, for Collins, “unspoken” or “unsaid”. Reber feels he is
being loyal to Polanyi. Collins notes in TEK that he is deliberately going
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beyond what Polanyi intended. In some instances we were agreeing on
the nature of tacit knowledge; in others disagreeing—and were often
bewildered by the incoherencies that emerged. This kind of disconnect
is dangerous because the terms are so familiar that it is hard to imagine
they might mean something different to the other party.7
Mismatched explanatory adequacy: As Collins sees it, the parties justify
claims in different ways. We saw this in a discussion of whether machines
can be classified as potentially knowledgeable or non-knowledgeable.
According to Collins, Reber works by building a consistent world view
based on consciousness as inherently subjective and embedded in evo-
lutionary theory. Collins claims there must be observable consequences
and Reber does not have them. Reber thinks Collins is wrong and that
he does have evidence for his position that is as strong or stronger than
the evidence for Collins’s position. But the notion of mismatched ex-
planatory adequacy remains useful even if, in this case, both parties are
wrong about what the other is trying to do. There are many cases where
parties disagree about what kind of grounding is needed to establish a
scientific result.
Mismatched saliences: Negative mismatched saliences occur because to
remedy an information deficit one needs an inventory of what is in the
other party’s head so one can see what is missing: such inventories do
not exist. Positive mismatched saliences affected the current exchange
because one party continually explained at length what the other party
already knew. For example, Reber explained the psychological equiv-
alent of Dreyfus’s five-stage theory of expertise several times because
Collins’s ignorance of it seemed, to Reber, the only way to make sense
of aspects of Collins’s position. Positive mismatched saliences are very
frustrating as they stop debates moving forward but they would proba-
bly be less marked in face-to-face conversation.8
Focus blindness: It is sometimes impossible to see a contribution that lies
in the peripheral field of a strongly focussed gaze. On occasions one of
7. Collins recalls another instance when philosopher Martin Kusch and he spent
months talking across each other while writing The Shape of Actions. The reason,
as they eventually realised, was that they were using the central term “action” in
different ways. To Kusch an action could be something accidental so long as it had
consequences—the sort of things that law courts are interested because it is necessary
to explore them in order to assign culpability. To Collins an action had to represent
a society—it had to be something like taking out a mortgage or divining a witch—an
accidental happening could not be an action however consequential it turned out to
be.
8. The term “mismatched saliences” (used for the negative version) is drawn from
Collins’s discussion of tacit knowledge (e.g., [TEK, 96]). Regarding positive mis-
matched saliences, in face-to-face conversation a quick technical comment can reveal
that one of the parties already understands a set of issues so it is appropriate to move
on. Collins uses the technique in interviews with scientists.
152 Harry Collins & Arthur Reber
us thought he had asked a certain question but the other did not see the
question because it was outside his view of the scope of their project.
The exchange would continue on the assumption that the other had seen
and appreciated the contribution. Confusion followed.
Reversion: Often one of us would explain an effect X to the other whose
response made it evident that he understood. But the understanding
was temporary. The problem was that X was held together in the longer
term by a semantic net which included W , Y , Z, etc., and the whole
structure only maintained its integrity through continual use. These
W ’s, X’s, Y ’s and Z’s are like the spinning plates in a juggler’s act—if
they are not kept spinning they fall. The dialogue, which was continued
by one of the parties as though X is still in play, reverts to the earlier
state of mutual incomprehension.9
Misplaced engagement: Often, to explore and explain two cross-cutting
views of the world, one needs to be distanced from them. But because
we were engaged in the worlds we were trying to explore, it was almost
impossible for us not to slip, every now and again, into trying to convince
the other that they were wrong—the traces are still in the text. Where
possible the argument should come only after the mutual exploration.
Coda
The thing about incommensurables, at least in Kuhn’s classic view, is that
they are, well, incommensurable. Perhaps not surprisingly, at the outset we
disagreed on this issue as well. Collins, having explored it at length [Collins
& Pinch 1982], [Collins, Evans & Gorman 2007], felt that situations like this
occurred often. Reber, armed only with a snifter of cognac, felt that dedicated
scientists should be able to bridge whatever conceptual gaps divided them
through careful reading, dispassionate reflection and intellectual empathy—
accompanied by tolerance and trust. He’s not so sure now. We found tolerance
and trust and we have tried our hardest to be clear, but there are still aspects
of the way the other thinks that seem strange. We’ve ended up in a unique
place: we have agreed to disagree even though, in more than a few cases, we
aren’t completely sure what we’re disagreeing about or why. But we have
learned something that we think is important. We have both been focused
on the same end point throughout our intellectual lives, understanding the
9. Locke said, you do not own something unless you mix your labour with it and
this applies to concepts too. That is why good educational systems teach concepts
via essays and seminars and why socialization is such an important part of education
and essential to genuine interdisciplinary work. Collins once took a leading part
on a seminar for natural science faculty that went smoothly for two years, the only
problem being that the participants tended to ask the same questions at the end of
the two years that they had asked at the beginning. Day-to-day everyone understood
everything that was being argued, but it slipped away because they were not mixing
their labour with it.
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human mind, the cultures we have constructed around us and the manifold
ways in which we function as individuals and as collectives. We understand
there is no one best way to get there. In fact, we both suspect that it is from
the conflicts, the misunderstandings, the incommensurables that we have a
decent chance at real progress—so long as the parties are willing to respect
and acknowledge the legitimacy of the other. We are now even more disdainful
of gangs of academics whose identity and self-esteem is tied up with cleaving
to one intellectual position and scorning those of others. We have come to
see that all intellectual positions are likely to have something valuable to offer
even if you cannot fully understand them and that the way forward is often
a mixture. We also realize that we both understand a lot more than we did
before we began this exchange.
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